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ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE IN DEPOSITION
PROCEEDINGS
A RECURRING problem in Texas today centers on the extent
to which a witness may be forced to disclose in a deposition
proceeding what he claims is privileged matter. If the matter is
privileged, it should not be subject to disclosure either in a pre-
trial deposition or at the trial of the case. It is proposed herein to
discuss how the privilege can best be invoked in an oral deposition
proceeding and what procedures should be followed once the
witness refuses to answer on the grounds of privilege. While this
Comment is limited in scope, the procedures suggested are gen-
erally applicable where there is a refusal to answer for any
reason.
Claiming the Privilege. A witness, either on the stand or at the
time of making a deposition, may refuse to answer on the basis
of at least three different types of privilege: 1. the privilege
against self-incrimination; 2. professional privileges; 3. privileges
as to matters injurious to the public interest.' The first classifica-
tion, derived from state and federal constitutions, has had many
claimants in recent Congressional hearings. This privilege against
self-incrimination may be invoked in civil actions as well as in
criminal cases.2 Similarly, the professional privilege of the at-
torney-client relationship which protects matters within that re-
lationship from disclosure has been claimed in both civil and
criminal actions.' Within the third category are state secrets and
certain information acquired by public officers.
It is not the purpose here to examine all the substantive law of
1 RAGLAND, DiscovEiiY BEFORE TRIAL (1932) 147.
2 Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World v. Bailey, 183 S. W. 107 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916), rev'd on other grounds, 222 S. W. 550 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).
s 44 Tax. Jua., Witnesses, § 93.
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privilege but rather to point out a suggested procedure for claim-
ing privilege. It is fundamental that the privilege is personal to
the witness, whether or not he is a party to the suit.4 This char-
acteristic must be kept in mind for it is the underlying theme
throughout the cases from which the procedure herein suggested
is derived.
Since the privilege is personal to one indivdual, no other per-
son may claim it for the witness. The witness must claim it him-
self if the privilege is to be invoked. In Ingersol v. McWillie the
court said that the party producing a witness did not have ground
for reversal of a judgment because the witness, without compulsion
by the court, answered a relevant question which was admissible,
though dealing with privileged matter. An extension of this hold.
ing is found where the courts have said that the adversary cannot
claim the privilege on behalf of the witness.' In San Antonio St.
Ry. Co. v. Muth7 the court stated that neither party could object to
testimony where the witness could have refused to testify on the
ground of self-incrimination but did not do so. Even in the
case of matter within the attorney-client privilege, the attorney
may not claim the privilege.' It belongs to the client.9
The problem has arisen whether or not the attorney producing
the witness or party may successfully invoke the privilege on be-
half of the witness by objecting that the question propounded calls
for a privileged answer. It may well be that the objection of the
attorney will be regarded as the objection of the client.'0 However,
in at least one case where counsel objected to a question which
would tend to incriminate his client, the court held that this was
4 Hines v. Howell, 15 S. W. 2d 1060 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
5 87 Tex. 647, 30 S. W. 869 (1895).
6 Smith v. Wilson, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 115, 20 S. W. 1119 (1892) er. dism.
7 Tex. Civ. App. 443, 27 S. W. 752 (1894) er. ref.
8 Ibanez v. State, 118 S. W. 2d 405, 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), citing McConMIcC
AND RAY, TEXAS LAW or EvIDNCE (1937).
9 Krumb v. Porter, 152 S. W. 2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) er. rel.
lo Ex parte Lipscomb, 111 Tex. 409, 239 S. W. 1101 (1922).
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not an attempt by the witness to exercise the privilege of declining
to answer, since privilege must be exercised by the witness alone."
Thus, we come back to the fundamental proposition: privilege is
personal.
Privilege, of course, may be waived.'" In fact, if it is not in-
voked, it is considered to be waived.' 8 Care must be taken that the
privilege is not invoked too late, since the witness must assert his
privilege at the earliest opportunity. Once he answers some privi-
leged questions, he cannot refuse to answer other questions proper
under cross-examination. 4 Thus, a waiver may occur even if a few
questions which are privileged are answered.'
It is recommended that in the event a question is asked which
deals with information within the scope of privilege, counsel for
deponent should immediately decide whether the privilege should
be waived or not. If the attorney then deems that waiver should be
avoided, he should object to the question, stating the grounds
therefor. He should then instruct the witness to refuse to answer.
The attorney should make certain that the witness personally states
to the officer taking the deposition why he refuses to answer, thus
claiming his privilege. If this procedure is followed, there will be
no question of waiver, no question that the privilege was claimed
by one not entitled to claim it, and no question concerning the
sufficiency of counsel's objection to invoke the' privilege of the
client.
A problem arises in deposition practice when, subsequent to
the taking of the deposition, counsel suddenly realizes that a
large number of the questions asked dealt with privileged matter
and that his witness answered them all without objection. What
11Ex parte Miers, 124 Tex. Crim. Rep. 592, 64 S. W. 2d 778 (1933).
12 Shelton v. Northern Texas Traction Co., 75 S. W. 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
13 Kolbrenner v. U. S., 11 F. 2d 754 (5th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U. S. 677
(1926).
14 Ex parte Adams, 76 Tex. Crim. Rep. 277, 174 S. W. 1044 (1915) ; Ex parte Park,
37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 590, 40 S. W. 300 (1897).
15For a discussion on the extent of the waiver of privilege, see 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 2276, 2327.
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can counsel do, if anything, to remedy this oversight on his part?
If the deposition was being taken for discovery purposes, then
counsel may as well resign himself to his fate, since the opposing
counsel has already garnered the sought-for fruits. On the other
hand, if the deposition was primarily to perpetuate testimony or
to serve as additional testimony at the trial, counsel may have a
possible solution. Rule 213 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
provides,
Depositions may be read in evidence upon the trial of any suit in
which they are taken, subject to all legal exceptions which might have
been made to the interrogatories and answers, were the witness per-
sonally present before the court giving evidence.
Counsel may urge that within the meaning of this rule, privilege
may be invoked at the trial if deponent wishes to do so. He may
thus preclude the introduction in evidence of that part of the
deposition which is protected. It is submitted that counsel's ob-
jection at the trial should not prove successful. The difficulty in it
is that the earlier failure to invoke the privilege has acted as a
waiver. Once a privilege is waived, the courts should not allow
subsequent reinstatement of that privilege. The situation is
fundamentally different from the instance where late objection is
made that testimony is irrelevant. An irrelevant question even
when answered remains irrelevant, and therefore subject to ob-
jection; however, privileged matter is normally admissible but for
the fact that the witness has insisted upon his privilege. Thus, it is
submitted that the waiver makes it admissible from that time on.
Review of the Claimed Privilege. When a witness refuses to
answer a question, the next step is up to the attorney taking the
deposition. He is faced with a witness who is refusing to answer
questions because opposing counsel has advised the witness that
the matter is privileged and should not be answered. It is recom-
mended that the examining attorney should get from the witness
a definite refusal to answer in order to lay the predicate for sub-
sequent proceedings. Questions should be repeated with different
1952]
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phraseology to avoid objections based upon the form of the ques-
tion, e.g., leading questions and those calling for a conclusion.
In many instances following the refusal the contending attorneys
will have a discussion off the record in an attempt to determine
whether the matter is truly privileged or not. It is possible that in
such discussion the examining attorney will obtain sufficient in-
formation to obviate the need for further pursuing the challenged
line of questioning. When the attorneys genuinely differ over
whether a question calls for a privileged answer or when a dispute
arises as to whether waiver of the privilege has occurred because
of prior answers, the examining attorney may, due to the exigencies
of the situation or for other reasons not wish to press the issue.
Where he seeks to compel answers to his questions, a difficult prob-
lem arises as to how he should proceed.
The examining attorney has two alternative routes available.
The first lies in completing the deposition as to all other matters
and then filing a motion in the court where the case is filed, seeking
an order compelling the deponent to answer. Practice varies as to
the matter included within this motion. The primary consideration
should be the placing of all necessary information before the
court. Some attorneys will include in the motion the entire deposi-
tion, while others will merely excerpt that portion where the
witness refused to answer. The court will then determine the basic
issue of privilege from a consideration of the questions and all
the surrounding circumstances. 16
This procedure was followed in Saenz v. Sanders,"7 a recent
case where the defendant gave proper notices and sought to take
the pre-trial deposition of the plaintiff. The plaintiff refused to
answer certain questions relative to the cause of action but did
not place his refusal on the basis of privilege. The defendant then
filed a motion seeking an order compelling the plaintiff to answer
the disputed questions. After hearing, the motion was granted, but
10 See text at notes 2 and 14 supra.
17 241 S. W. 2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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the plaintiff again refused to answer, thereby disobeying a specific
order of the court. To enforce its order, the court removed the
case from setting and declared that the setting would be made only
after the plaintiff answered the deposition. Since the deposition
was being used for discovery, the provisions of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure relating to confession were inapplicable. Only
direct answers would serve defendant's needs in the case. This
method of enforcement points up that Rule 1808 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure is not exclusive in providing a remedy if
a witness refuses to answer. Of course, the removal of a case
from setting would not be effective against a defendant. The
plaintiff in the Saenz case sought to review the trial court's action
by filing an application for a writ of mandamus in the court of
civil appeals. The writ was denied. A dissenting opinion urged
that the proper action by the trial court should have been a
contempt proceeding, from which an appeal could have been
taken through habeas corpus. The ruling of the court on the motion
and order to compel an answer is not reviewable by direct appeal,
since it is interlocutory. 9 The appellate courts will not interfere
unless there was a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion.
The second alternative procedure that the examining attorney
may use relies for its efficacy upon the powers possessed by the
notary public as an officer authorized to take depositions.2" At
common law the notary public could not punish for contempt
because he did not have judicial powers." In several states, legis-
tion giving the notary such authority has been enacted. Its consti-
tutionality has been questioned, particularly where the constitution
18 "Any witness refusing to give evidence may be committed to jail, there to re-
main without bail until such witness shall consent to give evidence."
19 4 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTIcE (1950) § 17.03; see Southern Bag and Bur.
lap v. Boyd, 120 Tex. 418, 38 S. W. 2d 565 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931).
20 TEX. REV. Cry. STAT. (VERNON, 1948) art. 3746 states: "The commission shall be
addressed to the following officers, either of whom may execute and return the same:
1. If the witness be alleged to reside or be within the State, to any ... notary public
of the proper county...."
21 12 Am. JuR., Contempt, p. 425, n. 19.
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vests the state judicial powers in specified courts and does not
mention notaries. Some of these statutes have been upheld2" while
others have been voided.23
Texas has such legislation in Articles 374824 and 375725 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948). A question of consti-
tutionality may be raised since Article V, Section 1, of the Texas
Constitution names specific judicial tribunals and does not include
notaries therein. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals discussed
this question in Ex parte Wolf 6 but did not decide the issue. Texas
Jurisprudence is of the opinion that there is no authority vested
in a notary public, engaged in taking a deposition, to punish for
contempt." Cited for this proposition is Ex parte Johnson.2" It
should be noted, however, that this case contains no reference to
either Article 3748 or Article 3757 or their forebears.
In light of this, there is little wonder that notaries are very
reluctant to compel a deponent to answer questions in a deposition
proceeding. Despite the seemingly clear language of the statutes,
there is grave doubt whether they actually possess such power.
Article 3769b29 of Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948)
provides a solution where a witness disobeys a writ issued by a
22 Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N. E. 276 (1906) ; De Camp v. Archibald, 50
Ohio St. 618, 35 N. E. 1056 (1893) ; see Note, 8 A. L .R. 1575 (1920).
23 Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N. E. 190 (1892); Re Huron, 58 Kan.
152, 48 Pac. 574 (1897).
24 "If the witness, after being duly summoned, shall fail to appear, or, having ap-
peared, shall refuse to answer the interrogatories, such officer shall have power to issue
an attachment against such witness and to fine and imprison him in like manner as
the district and county courts are empowered to do in like cases."
25 "Said officer shall have the same power and authority to enforce the attendance
of the witness, and to compel him to testify, as in cases of written interrogatories."
26 116 Tex. Crim. Rep. 127, 34 S. W. 2d 277, 278 (1930).
27 9 Tix. JUR., Contempt, § 22.
28 54 Tex. Crim. Rep. 113, 111 S. W. 743 (1908).
29 "Whenever any commission for the taking of the deposition of any witness or
party to any civil suit pending in any of the courts of Texas shall have been regularly
and legally issued and placed in the hands of a person legally designated and qualified
to take depositions under the laws of this state such officer shall have authority to
issue any writ authorized by law to compel the attendance of a witness in court, and
upon disobedience of such writ by any such witness he may be punished as for con-
tempt either by the court out of which such commission issued, or by the Judge of any
District Court of the County in which such witness resides."
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notary public to compel attendance at the taking of a deposition.
In such cases the district judge of the county of residence of the
witness, or the court out of which the commission was issued, may
punish the witness for contempt. Article 3769b does not super-
sede Articles 3748 and 3757 but provides an alternative. And a
clear distinction exists in that it applies only to compelling attend-
ance and not the compelling of answers.
If a notary exercises his powers under the statutes, review of
his action must be by way of a habeas corpus proceeding. There
is no provision for a direct appeal to the district judge. However,
if it can be shown that the notary public is completely without
jurisdiction, there is a likelihood that a temporary restraining
order and injunction may be obtained. In a case where the com-
missioners' court was acting without jurisdiction in questioning a
witness, a restraining order and injunction were successfully
sought."0 Only a few cases reviewing such action of a notary have
arisen.3 All of these were habeas corpus proceedings. In Harbison
v. McMurray"' the Texas Supreme Court held that the appeal in a
habeas corpus proceeding arising from a civil suit was a civil case
within the meaning of Article V, Section 6, of the Constitution
and Article 2249 of Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948).
The hearing on habeas corpus of necessity will involve whether
or not the question originally asked where privileged. The court
of civil appeals in a later proceeding in the Harbison case said:
The legality of the commitment depends on whether the notary had
the power or jurisdiction to ask the questions and compel the appel-
lant to answer them. 3
The record must affirmatively show facts on which the court can
determine that the notary had such power.3'
30 Harris County v. Bassett, 139 S. W. 2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) er. rel.
31 Cases cited notes 26 and 28 supra; Harbison v. McMurray, 132 S. W. 2d 916,
rev'd and remanded, 138 Tex. 192, 158 S. W. 2d 284 (1942), later proceedings, 163 S. W.
2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
32 138 Tex. 192, 158 S. W. 2d 284 (1942).




It is suggested that the examining attorney should not attempt
to invoke this second method of compelling a witness to answer,
since there is the practical difficulty of getting the notary to
exercise powers which in themselves are questionable. This con-
sideration, together with the severity of the penalty on the
deponent and the necessity for strict compliance with the statutes
in order to imprison for contempt, suggests that the procedure
should be invoked only in cases of extreme urgency.
Conclusion. This Comment has attempted to point up some of
the current problems and practices involved in oral deposition pro-
ceedings in Texas today where the witness refuses to answer on
the basis of privilege. There is little to be found on the subject
in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. It is believed that the
adoption of some provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure would prove beneficial. For example, Federal Rule 26(b)
expressly sets out that the deponent may not be examined about
privileged matters. Beyond this, the Federal Rules provide safe-
guards which aid both examining attorney and counsel for
deponent in making certain that privileged matter will not be
violated, yet provide effective means of ascertaining what is
privileged. 5 While Texas has many of the same procedures, it is
respectfully suggested that a clear-cut procedure covering the
problems of privilege in deposition practice should be spelled
out in the Texas Rules.
Jerry N. Jordan.
85 Rules 30(d), 31(d), 37. But see Comment, 59 Yale L. J. 117 (1949) for a critical
discussion of these rules.
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